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Abstract 
 
Two theories are now used to explain the size and composition of interest 
communities: Olson’s (1965; 1982) bottom-up collective action model and Gray and 
Lowery’s top-down ESA model.  Unfortunately, one of the common ways of testing 
these models – aggregate-level analyses of interest populations – cannot easily 
distinguish between them.  Empirical evidence supporting one model will almost 
inevitably support the other.  We explain why this is o, illustrating the problem with data 
on state populations of health interest organizations.  We also discuss how the two 
models might be better distinguished.   
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The Construction of Interest Communities: 
Distinguishing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Models 
 
 
At one time, the construction of interest communities was not viewed as 
perplexing.  In Truman’s (1951) view, individuals naturally come together to pursue 
collective interests.  The resulting population of lobby organizations might be large or 
small depending on the number of policy concerns driving joining and it might be biased 
with respect to the distribution of interests in society.  But interest system size and bias 
would reflect the pattern of disturbances motivating i dividuals to join.  This 
straightforward understanding of the construction of interest systems has now been 
replaced by two competing models.  The first is Olson’  (1965) model of collective 
action in which rational economic calculation by individuals determines the mobilization 
of lobby organizations, which then accumulate in a fashion that is essentially 
unconstrained by other organizations.  The interesting action in this model is at the 
bottom of the process – individual decisions leading to mobilization events.  In contrast, 
Gray and Lowery’s (1996a) energy, stability, area (ESA) model highlights the role of 
environmental resources in constraining the size of interest populations.1  These top-
down constraints are viewed as so severe as to more pr ximally determine the size and 
composition of interest systems. 
These competing perspectives have profoundly different implications for how we 
understand the nature of interest system bias, the linkage of individual member 
                                                
1 This view is more consistent with sociological approaches to organizational theory.  
Key works include Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976), Hanna and Freeman (1989), and Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978). 
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preferences and lobbying objectives, the ultimate siz of interest systems, and their 
consequences for public policy.  This suggests that we need to distinguish which of the 
two models provides a more valid enumeration of the construction rules governing 
interest communities.  Unfortunately, one of the common ways in which both models are 
tested – aggregate-level analyses of interest populations – cannot easily distinguish 
between then.  Empirical evidence supporting one will inevitably support the other.  We 
examine this problem by first explaining this equivalence.  We then illustrate the problem 
with data on state populations of health interest organizations.  We also discuss how the 
two models might be better distinguished using both aggregate- and more micro-level 
data on organized interests.  Finally, we discuss why these results suggest that past 
aggregate analyses using an Olsonian framework may need to be reconsidered. 
Distinguishing the Two Models 
 In Truman’s model, neither the individuals who join interest organizations nor the 
organizations themselves were seriously constrained by environmental forces.  Truman 
(1951, 156-87), of course, did assume that the policy positions espoused by organized 
interests are constrained toward moderation by their need to satisfy the heterogeneous 
preferences of members who might also join other organized interests.  And how well 
leaders manage distributions of members’ preferences might well influence an 
organization’s survival prospects and, thereby, the siz  and composition of interest 
communities (Truman 1951, 188-211).  But these constrai ts arise from the internal 
distributions of preferences within membership organizations.  Truman did not imagine – 
beyond a secondary role for counter-disturbances – that forces beyond the intersection of 
policy disturbances and individual interests might limit innate proclivities to join.   
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In this regard, Olson’s (1965) model share much wit Truman’s.  In both, 
individual preferences constitute the basic motivation for group formation and variations 
in how these preferences are reflected in patterns of mobilization constitute the key 
explanatory problem.  In both, the aggregation of interest organizations into interest 
communities is but an epiphenomenon arising from indiv dual choices (Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991, 2).  Olson departed radically from Truman, however, by weighing 
policy preferences as a motive for joining with a calculation of its opportunity cost.  
Incentives to free ride on the political activity of others are ubiquitous, but their import 
varies in two ways (Olson 1965, 53-64).  The first lies in the balance of collective and 
private goods that are the focus of policy preferences.  If the latter prevails, then free 
riding is not possible and Truman’s expectation of a natural link between preferences, 
disturbances, and mobilization should obtain.  Incentiv s to free ride should also vary by 
the size of the referent community of fellow participants, a contextual factor that is 
independent of preferences per se.  If there a few potential members of a group – whether 
individuals in a membership group, institutions considering forming a trade association, 
or individual institutions contemplating lobbying directly for collective goods – then the 
likelihood of free riding declines.   
 If Olson’s analysis stopped at this point, the epiphenomenon of lobbying 
communities would be expected to be uniformly small and highly biased toward 
organizations seeking private goods and only small groups seeking collective goods.  But 
Olson (1965, 132-167) went on to consider the relationship of inducements and 
contributions,2 arguing that if incentives to free ride undermine th  mobilization of large 
                                                
2 And surprisingly, given its role as a foundational analysis underlying the ESA model, 
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groups, then entrepreneurs can offer selective incentives as side payments to induce 
participation.  Olson (1982, 40) also asserted that interest organizations rarely die once 
having overcome the initial barriers to mobilization via selective incentives: 
“Organizations with selective incentives in stable societies normally survive 
indefinitely.”  When coupled with a further assumption that the potential supply of 
selective benefits is unlimited with no declining marginal utility, this implies that interest 
populations are essentially unlimited.   
 In sum, Olson’s model is a bottom-up view of the construction of interest 
communities.  The critical action takes place at the level of the member.  Their 
preferences for collective action are surely real.  But their pursuit is influenced by the 
number of other individuals who might join an organiz tion or other organizations that 
might engage in political activity.  These numbers define the severity of the collective 
action problem faced by organizations.  Interest organization populations, in this 
interpretation, are artifacts in that they are the products of the severity of the collective 
action problem within different populations of members.  Interest communities are thus 
constructed from the bottom up as interest organizations solve over time their respective 
collective action problems.  But once having solved its own collective action problem, 
each organization has no real bearing on the vitality rates of others in the community. 
Gray and Lowery’s (1996a) ESA model of interest community density is largely 
agnostic about the individual-level mobilization, working equally well with either a basic 
Trumanesque or Olsonian view of individual mobilization.  But in explaining interest 
                                                                                                                                      
this notion was also incorporated as a central theme in resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
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communities, the ESA model is top-down in orientation in emphasizing environmental 
constraints, not individual-level motivations.  Thus, the key variable determining vital 
rates of interest organizations is the presence of other interest organizations potentially 
representing the same interests.  This variable is the area term of the ESA model, which is 
usually interpreted as the potential number of constituents in the interest domain that 
might be represented by an interest organization.  The main effect of this variable is 
positive; we should observe more organizations when w  observe more potential 
constituents.  But this relationship is expected to be progressively less positive so that 
growth rates decline as numbers of potential constituents increase.  This reflects density 
dependence or crowding as similar organizations competitively exclude each other from 
ever finer representation of interests and the resources needed for organizational 
maintenance.  At some point, quite simply, there is a declining marginal return from ever 
more fine-grained representation of interests and reliance on ever narrower resource 
bases.  As a result, and in sharp contrast to Olson’s expectations, the birth rates of new 
organizations should decline and/or the death rates of older organizations should increase 
as interest communities become more crowded (Gray and Lowery 2001; Nownes 2004; 
Nownes and Lipinski 2005). 
The other terms of the ESA model reflect, respectivly, insights from Truman and 
Olson.  Energy refers to the policy issues of concern to lobbying or anization and the 
level of uncertainty about their resolution that are used to stimulate mobilization.  These 
are typically measured by the size of political agenda in a given policy area and level of 
party competition, respectively (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005; Lowery, 
Gray, Fellowes, and Anderson 2004; Brasher, Lowery, and Gray 1999; Lowery 2007).  
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Thus, the energy term of the model reflects Truman’s (1951) notion that policy 
disturbances promote mobilization.  In the ESA model, however, this is a more secondary 
determinant that raises or lowers the more important de sity response function with 
respect to number of constituents.  The stability term of the model draws on Olson’s 
insight that interest communities must be largely rconstructed from scratch after 
profound changes in political regimes such as after devastating wars.3   But while Olson 
(1982) viewed such processes as occurring over a century or so, ESA empirical analyses 
have found that interest systems reach equilibrium or their carrying capacity for interest 
organizations far more quickly.  Thus, while the stability term is of theoretical interest, it 
does not have empirical import in stable democracies. 
The ESA model of interest system density thus emphasizes top-down processes in 
which number of potential constituents sets in a density dependent manner the basic 
carrying capacity of political systems for organized interests.4  This density dependent 
response function may be lowered or raised by the size of the political agenda and the 
level of uncertainly associated with different levels of party competition.  But overall, 
interest systems are self-limiting as crowding suppresses birth rates and enhances death 
rates within guilds of organized interests.  Another implication of the model that will 
                                                
3 Or more precisely, both insights draw from population biology’s analysis of changes in 
bio-diversity following devastating environmental events such as volcanic eruptions. 
4 Or, perhaps it might be better to say that population pressures and constraints in the 
ESA model are lateral in nature in that crowding among similar or related organizations 
and fixed resources in the environment work together to limit the size of interest 
populations.   
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become important later arises from its assumption that the density dependent response 
functions of different guilds vary and the observation that the content of policy agendas 
change over time.  That is, given differences in the heterogeneity of issues within interest 
guilds and variations in average capacities across guilds to organize, density dependent 
mobilization rates will vary across guilds.  In contrast to conventional interpretation of 
bias in interest communities (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), then, 
the diversity of interest communities is complexly related to the distribution of interests 
in society (Lowery and Gray 2004a; Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2004). 
The Olson and ESA models suggest a number of test implications at individual- 
and aggregate-levels, test implications that scholars h ve not been shy to exploit.  Both 
levels of analysis are important.  But for those int rested in the overall size and growth of 
interest systems, bias in interest communities, and its consequences for public policy, 
aggregate-level tests are especially interesting.  But here is where our problem arises.  
That is, the models typically used to test the aggre ate implications of the Olson and ESA 
models cannot easily distinguish between them.  Results that are supportive of one model 
will be equally supportive of the other.    
To see this, consider first the typical aggregate-level test of Olson’s hypothesis 
(e.g., Andres 1985; Bois 1989; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991; 1994; Masters and 
Keim 1985; McKeown 1994; Humphries 1991; Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997; 
Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Lowery, Gray, Anderson, and Newmark 2004),5 which can be 
                                                
5 Most of this work has been done on PACs.  Unfortuna ely, PACs are a remarkably 
inappropriate venue in which to test either hypothesis given that the theory speak to 
mobilization to lobby, not the frequency of use of a specific lobbying tool, such as 
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expressed as follows: 
Eq1:  (LR / PLR) =  – 1 PLR 
where LR is the number of lobby registrations actually observed and PLR is the number 
of potential lobby registrations or the full population from which actual registrations are 
drawn.6  The ratio of LR and PLR is lobbying rate or the proportion of institutions of a 
given type (industry or jurisdiction, typically) that actually choose to lobby.  As indicated 
by the negatively signed slope coefficient, lobbying rate is expected to decline as the 
number of institutions that might lobby increases.  In short, the severity of the collective 
action problem should increase with the number of organizations that might lobby, which 
Olson suggests should lead to free riding or a declining proportion of potential lobbying 
organization actually opting to lobby.   
 Now, consider the comparable basic ESA model used in aggregate-level tests 
                                                                                                                                      
political action committees (Gray and Lowery 1997a).  This may account for the 
traditionally weak and inconsistent results on the collective action hypothesis in this 
literature. Even so, equation 1, is a rather extreme si plification of the models used in 
these analyses.  That is, most were designed to test a range of hypotheses, most of which 
go beyond our concerns.   
6 Some studies – PAC studies especially – tend to use a variant of this model where 
individual firms are the unit of analysis (rather than industries, states, or a combination of 
the two) and the dependent variable is the firm’s decision to lobby or not lobby or to have 
or not have a PAC.  These models then include measur s of the size of the 
industries/states to test the collective action hypothesis.   These models are functionally 
organizational-level equivalents of the model identified in equation 1. 
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(Gray and Lowery 1996a; Lowery and Gray 1995; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and 
Anderson 2005; Lowery, Gray, Fellowes, and Anderson 2004).  Ignoring the 
complication of density dependence for now, the core element of the ESA model can be 
represented as: 
Eq.2:  LR =  + 1 PLR 
where LR is again the number of lobby registrations a d PLR is the number of potential 
lobby registrations.  The positive slope coefficient suggests that the number of 
organizations actually lobbying is positively relatd to the number of potential lobbying 
organizations.   
Obviously, the numerator in the stripped-down Olson equation is the dependent 
variable in the short version of the ESA model.  More importantly, both employ the same 
independent variable: the potential number of organization lobby registrants.  If both 
dependent variables have, as expected, a strong relationship with that independent 
variable, they will be related to each other, if only i  a spurious fashion.  This 
relationship, however, becomes more than spurious once we consider their shared 
independent variable: the number of organizations that could potentially lobby.  Indeed, 
any two of these three variables define an accounting identity.  If the size of the potential 
lobbying population and number of lobbying registrations are known, we can calculate 
lobbying participation rate.  Conversely, given thelobby participation rate and the size of 
the potential lobbying population, we can calculate how many organizations are 
registered to lobby.  And more to the point, if theslope coefficient of the ESA model in 
equation 2 is greater than zero and less than one, the same data will always produce 
results that would be consistent with the Olson model’s expectation of a negative 
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estimate in equation 1.  And such expectations are quit  reasonable.7  The ESA 
hypothesis posits that the slope coefficient in equation 1 should be greater than zero.  And 
while the ESA model does not strictly require that the number of lobby organizations 
should increase at a slower rate than the number of potential organizations that might 
lobby, this expectation is strongly implied by the density dependence hypothesis.8   
We will demonstrate this last relationship empirically below.  In a strict sense, of 
course, such a demonstration is unnecessary since they are logical or mathematical in 
character.  Still, we will see that empirical tests point toward some indirect means of 
distinguishing the two models.  In conducting these tests, however, we use somewhat 
more elaborate version of the two models: 
Eq. 3:  (LR / PLR) =  – 1 PLR + 2 PLR
2 + 3 PC + 4 PA, and 
Eq. 4:  LR =  + 1 PLR – 2 PLR
2 + 3 PC +4 PA 
where LR and PLR are again number of lobby registrat ons and number of potential 
registrations.  We have added to both models measurs of the level of party competition 
(PC) and the size of the policy agenda of interest to the interest guilds (PA) to reflect the 
energy term of the ESA model.  These are key parts of the ESA model.  Adding them to 
the collective action model in equation 3 renders the empirical estimates more 
                                                
7 Actually, even this condition is too strongly stated.  The slope coefficient in equation 2 
need only be less than 1.0 for the same data to generate results supportive of an Olson 
model of the form of equation 2. 
8 Importantly, this expectation is not necessarily tue with respect to the use of specific 
lobbying techniques like the establishment of PACs by organizations that have already 
opted to lobby given the crowded room hypothesis (see: Gray and Lowery 1997a). 
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comparable and should do no great damage to the Olson model as this essentially entails 
adding irrelevant explanatory variables to it.  
We’ve also added the squared term of potential number of lobby registrations to 
both models.  The polynomial specification of PLR is essential to test the ESA density 
dependence hypothesis that growth in registration declines as number of potential 
registrations increases.  The ESA model suggests tha  the linear term of the model should 
generate a positive estimate and its squared term a neg tive estimate.  We included this 
polynomial specification in the Olson model represented by equation 3 for better reasons, 
however, than merely allowing us to compare the models irectly.  That is, while most 
prior aggregate tests of  the Olson model examine only the linear impact of potential 
number of lobby registrants (or the size of the industry) on participation rates, this seems 
to us an unreasonable specification.  Simply put, it suggests that the enhanced incidence 
of free riding resulting from an increase in the potential number of organizations that 
might lobby from 999 to 1,000 organizations or indivi uals will be the same as an 
increase from 4 to 5.  It seems far more plausible, and consistent with Olson’s analysis, 
that the decline in lobby participation rates (LPR) should slow as number of potential 
organizations that might lobby becomes smaller and organizations thereby become more 
cognizant of each other.    
Empirically Analyzing the Models 
Data and Operationalizations 
 We test the models with data on lobby registrations among health interest 
organizations in the American states.  The states provide us with considerable variation in 
all of the variables specified in both models and thus serve as our unit of analysis.  The 
Lowery, Gray, Monogan 
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dependent variables in the ESA models are the number or density of lobby registrations 
in the states by health organizations concerned, respectively, with: 1.) direct patient care, 
2.) drugs and health products, 3.) health finance, 4.) local government health agencies, 5.) 
health care advocacy, 6.) health professional associati ns, and 7.) health education 
institutions.9   We also analyze the total number of health organizations.  These eight 
categories were aggregated upward from an even finer 18 category coding of the 
substantive interests of health organization lobby registrations.  These are reported in the 
                                                
9 The state lobby registration data have been described elsewhere (Gray and Lowery 
2001).  Briefly, lobby registration lists were gathered by mail or web page from state 
agencies responsible for their maintenance.  After purging the lists of state agencies in 
states requiring their registration, organizations registered to lobby – not individual 
lobbyists – were coded by organizational type (membrship group, institution, or 
association) and interest content (26 guilds of substantive interests) using directories of 
organizations and associations and the web pages of organizations.  A second coder 
examined the coding assignments with discrepancies resolved via discussion.   Only 1.58 
percent of the 35,928 organizational lobby registrations in 1997 could not be coded by 
type or substantive interest.  The organizations in the health category among the complete 
population of guilds were then recoded by substantive interest using 18 categories 
reported in appendix 1.  Only 38 organizations or 0.66 percent of the 1997 health 
population could not be coded by these categories of substantive interest.  Fortunately, 
previous work indicates that the stringency of state lobbying registration requirements 
has little impact on the density (Lowery and Gray 1997; 1994) and diversity (Gray and 
Lowery 1998) of state interest communities.   
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JOP Web Appendix associated with this article along with examples of organizations in 
each category.  In the end, we opted for the more highly aggregated seven-fold 
classification for convenience.10  In the Olson models, the dependent variables are lobby 
participation rates – the ratio of the number of organizations actually registered to lobby 
to the total number of organizations that potentially might lobby – of the same seven 
health guilds and the total number of health interest organizations.    
The health interest guild is especially appropriate for testing our hypothesis since 
its seven sub-guilds vary remarkably in size and makeup among themselves as well as 
across the states.  As seen in figure 1, 5,658 organized interests with health concerns 
registered to lobby in 1997, for an average of 113.6 registrations.11  This is our 
                                                
10 The results were essentially the same at both levels of analysis.  But seven or eight sets 
of results are more readily presented than 18..  For example, when the 1997 direct patient 
care model was re-estimated using the seven sub- categories of organizations providing 
direct patient care, essentially the same results were generated.  Six of the seven 
coefficients of the area or supply variable were signed correctly and significant as were 
four of the estimates for their squared values.  Six of seven party competition estimates 
were signed correctly and significant, as were fouragenda coefficients.  While there was 
some noise associated with employing such a fine lev l of aggregation where numbers of 
registrations were very low, the results nonetheless were very consistent with those 
presented here.   
11 This number is larger than we have previously repoted in work analyzing 26 interest 
guilds and results from our recoding for this project pharmaceutical and drug product 
manufacturing firms as health rather than manufacturing organizations, and health 
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dependent variable in the ESA models.  As seen in the first two columns of table 2, 50.14 
percent of the health organization registrations in the average state in 1997 were 
concerned with direct patient care.  In the average state, the next largest category was 
drug and health product organizations, followed by health professional associations and 
health education institutions, health care advocacy groups, health finance organizations, 
and local government health groups and agencies.    
The populations from which these registrations were drawn were also quite 
diverse.  A measure of the size of such populations is, of course, the area term of the ESA 
model and both an independent variable and the denominator in the dependent variable of 
the Olson model.  For all but one of our health guilds, the populations from which 
organized institutions are drawn are institutions such as hospitals, medical schools, 
doctors’ offices and HMOs, pharmaceutical firms, and insurance companies.  For these, 
population size or area is measured by the number of establishments in a state in 1997 
associated with the interests of the sub-guild.12  
There were, however, several exceptions to this strategy.  First, as seen in the 
appendix, the health finance sub-guild includes healt  plans, health business services, 
employer health coalition, and insurance organizations.  Data on establishments was 
                                                                                                                                      
insurance firms as health organizations rather thanfin cial, insurance, and real estate 
organizations.  Neither coding scheme is necessarily preferred in any objective sense 
since they speak to different theoretical purposes. 
12 The Census Bureau’s NAICS codes used to assign the es ablishments in a state to each 
sub-guild are reported in the last column of the appendix.    
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available for only the last.  Thus, the area or supply terms of the health finance model tap 
a narrower range of organization activity than many of the others.  Second, the Census 
Bureau did not provide data on government establishments.  So, for local government 
health agency supply, we use the number of general pu pose local governments and 
health special districts in a state.  Third, associations of health professionals are founded 
not on institutions but on individual health professionals such as doctors and nurses.  The 
interest organizations in this sub-guild are true membership groups.  For this sub-guild, 
then, the sizes of the potential populations from which lobbying organizations might be 
drawn are measured by the number of health professinal  in a state in 1998 as reported 
by the Department of Labor.  Fourth, the area term of the health education sub-guild is 
measured by the number of medical and nursing schools in a state.  As seen in figure 2, 
the lobby registrants representing direct patient care issues are drawn from a very large 
population – the average state had fully 10,341.66 direct patient care organizations in 
1997.  This contrast to the smaller average populations from which health education 
(13.46 institutions), local government (71.40), health finance (63.86), and health 
advocacy (66.26) lobby organizations were drawn.  The average number of drug and 
health product firms in the states was 288.56. 
 The dependent variable in the Olson model is participation rate or the ratio of the 
actual number of lobby registrations by health organiz tions to the size of the population 
from which they are drawn.  As seen in figure 3, health advocacy organizations had, on 
average, the highest participation rate with 22.95 percent.  The lowest rates were for 
health professionals.  Given that the denominator is measured in hundreds, the 
participation rate of 0.01 percent reported in figure 3 indicates that the average state had 
Lowery, Gray, Monogan 
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one registration by a health professional group per thousand health professionals.  The 
remaining participation rates fall between these two extreme values. 
 The energy term is represented by party competition and the size of the health 
policy agenda of substantive concern to potential lobby organizations.  As party 
competition heightens, the likelihood of sudden policy change increases, encouraging 
both those favored by as well as those disadvantaged by the status quo to become active.  
We tap this uncertainty with the folded Ranney Index of state party competition 
(available for 48 states) in 1997.  Since this measure is inversely coded, with values near 
one indicating one-party dominance, negative estimates will indicate that competition 
promotes mobilization.  Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson (2005) following the 
lead of Bowling and Ferguson (2001) and Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue (2002), 
measure constituent interest by the size of the agenda of concern to an interest guild as 
indicated by the number of bills on the topic considered by the legislature.  We developed 
a comparable measure of the size of the health agend  before state legislatures in 1997.13  
                                                
13 Bill count data was collected from the "State Full Text of Bills" database on Nexis 
Academic Universe. The database is maintained by LexisN xis, a division of Reed 
Elsevier Inc, and is available for a fee at http://www.nexis.com.   The database contains 
bill text files of all bills considered by each statehouse in a calendar year with each bill 
assigned a set of subject codes, providing a separate listing for each revised version of a 
bill in the database.  For example, Alabama House Bill 175, which appropriated 
$4,564,831 to the Department of Public Health in 1997, was listed five times in the 
database: one entry was the initial version, three w re revisions, and the fifth was the 
enacted bill.  Multiple counts are appropriate because the concerns of organized interests 
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Our measures count the number of bills with a “health” subject code each year.  In 1997, 
the average number of bill counts was 278, ranging from a low of 17 in Kentucky to a 
high of 1,409 in California.  The same agenda size measure is employed in all sub-guild 
models.   
Initial Findings 
 The results in table 1 provide considerable support for Olson’s model.  The 
negative estimates for the linear area variable (PLR) are significant in all cases indicating 
that participation rates decline as the potential size of lobbying communities increases.  
The squared value of PLR generates uniformly positive estimates and five of eight are 
significant at the 0.05 level.  Within an Olsonian framework, these estimates suggest that 
free riding declines as numbers of potential lobby organizations declines.  This is 
illustrated in figure 4, which presents the relationship between lobby participation rate in 
the states among health finance establishments and the numbers of such establishments, 
while ignoring the effects of the other independent variables.14  Lobbying participation 
falls from 50 percent in states with fewer than 20 or so health finance organizations to 
less than 10 percent for those with more than 150 such organizations.15   
                                                                                                                                      
about bills should heighten as they move through the legislative process. 
14 Extensive analyses of these and other data suggest that the effects of the area terms of 
the models are remarkably independent of agenda size and party competition and so can 
be examined independently.    Still, the figures we present on health finance organizations 
should be viewed as partial and incomplete models that are more useful for illustration 
than for providing a complete story.  
15 Similar figures have been constructed for all of the sub-guilds.  All are remarkably 
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 The results for the energy terms of the model are more mixed.  All but one of the 
party dominance estimates generated negative estimates, indicating that participation 
rates decline as party competition falls.  Still, only six of the estimates are discernibly 
different from zero.  And only one agenda size coeffici nt (for health finance 
organizations) is positive and significant, which suggests that the size of the issue agenda 
before legislatures has little to do with lobbying participation rates.  Overall, then, these 
results can certainly be interpreted as supporting the Olson model; size of the potential 
lobbying community matters, but not much else.  
 Yet, much the same can be said for the ESA model as seen in Table 2.  The 
dependent variable is the raw number of lobby registrat ons.  In this case, six of the area 
or LR estimates generated the expected positive and sig ificant estimates while five of 
the squared LR estimates generated the expected negative and significant estimates.  In 
fact, all of the former would have produced positive, significant estimates had the 
squared variable been excluded.  This suggests that while registrations increase with the 
density of the population from which lobby groups are drawn, this relationship is only 
weakly density dependent for the small local governme t and health education guilds.  
This will become important later when we compare the two models.  For now though, it 
seems as if the core area element of the ESA model is supported by these results.  This is 
illustrated in figure 5 which presents the relationship between total registrations by health 
finance organizations in the states and their numbers of such establishments while again 
ignoring the other independent variables.16  Lobby registrations increases from under 10 
                                                                                                                                      
alike.   
16 Again, similar figures have been constructed for all of the other sub-guilds and all are 
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in states with very few health finance establishments to 20 or more for states with 300 
such organizations.  Further, the rate of increase in r gistrations visibly declines as 
number of establishments increases.   
 Table 2 also provides support for the ESA energy hypothesis with the party 
dominance estimates having the expected negative and sig ificant estimates in all but one 
case.  Registrations are higher in states with more c mpetitive parties.  And in sharp 
contrast to the Olson results, seven of the eight estimates for agenda size (all but the 
estimate for the local government model) are positive and significant, indicating that 
number of registrations increases as the size of the health policy agenda being considered 
by state legislatures grows.   
Interpreting the Results 
 We have, then, two sets of closely related results that seem to support two distinct 
theories about the construction of interest systems.  The two models are, of course, 
account for variance in somewhat different dependent variables – lobbying participation 
rates and total numbers of lobby registrations.  It would be very nice if in a spirit of 
scholarly reconciliation we could combine the models so that all flowers could bloom.  
Unfortunately, we cannot do so for three reasons.  Thefirst and most telling reason is that 
the two dependent variables and their shared independent variable define, as noted 
earlier, an accounting identity.  If the size of the potential lobby population and number 
of lobby registrations are determined, we will know by calculation the lobbying 
participation rate.  Conversely, if we know the rate of lobby participation and the size of 
                                                                                                                                      
remarkably similar, especially so since this is onef our more problematic guilds in 
terms of the squared term. 
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the potential lobby population, we can calculate the number of lobby registrations. By 
definition, then, one or the other dependent variable is an artifact of the process 
generating the other.  Thus, we cannot be agnostic about which process truly merits 
explication. 
 Second, and somewhat counter-intuitively given what has just been said, it is also 
true that once we go beyond their theoretical relationship, the information captured 
empirically by the relationship of the Olson dependt variable and the size of the 
potential lobby population cannot be easily substituted for knowledge about the 
relationship of the ESA dependent variable and the siz  of the potential lobby population.  
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate why this is so.  Figure 6 presents the relationship between the 
predicted values generated from figures 4 and 5, our simplified Olson and ESA models 
for the health finance guild.  As is readily apparent, there is a very strong relationship (R-
square = 0.97).17  Indeed, as seen in figure 8, which presents the comparable R-square 
values for all of our models, the predicted values for lobby participation rates and lobby 
registrations are very, very high, which reflects the strong relationship of both to the size 
of the potential lobby community, their shared independent variable.  But this does not 
mean that the actual values of the two dependent variables are closely related.  As seen in 
figure 7, actual rates of lobby participation by health finance organizations are only 
weakly related to actual numbers of lobby registrations by such organizations across the 
states (R-square = 0.04).  In empirical terms, then, the strong relationship in figure 6 is 
                                                
17 Indeed, the only reason that the R-square value is not 1.0 is that the two polynomial 
specifications tend to treat extreme values in the curvilinear relationships a bit differently.  
When a simple linear specification has been used, the R-square values are uniformly 1.0.   
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almost entirely spurious, a result of the two dependent variables’ common relationship to 
their shared independent variable PLF.  While both dependent variables are strongly 
related to that independent variable, they are related to it in very different ways.  Nor, as 
seen in figure 9, is this unique to this sub-guild; the relationships between the actual 
values of the two dependent variables is very, veryweak across all of the models.  
This means that we cannot readily substitute information from one model into the 
other.  If the Olson model fully captured the causal process running from size of the 
potential lobby population to participation rate, then we should be able to substitute 
participation rate into the ESA model in lieu of the two area terms of the model and 
generate a significant positive estimate for our substitute measure.  Simply put, 
participation rate would have already built into it all of the information carried by the 
polynomial area estimates in the ESA model.  But as seen in table 3, such substitution 
does not work, or at least does not work well.  While the party dominance and agenda 
size variables retain the magnitudes observed in table 2, three of eight participation rate 
estimates are wrongly signed and only three are significant.  While we will see later that 
these three estimates can still tell us something useful, the overall pattern of results in 
table 3 suggests that we cannot readily translate empirical results from one model into the 
other.  
Third, the two model have profoundly different implications for how we 
understand the nature of interest system bias, the linkage of individual member 
preferences and lobby objectives, the ultimate size of interest systems, and their 
consequences in terms of public policy (Lowery and Gray 2004b).  The larger theoretical 
construct in which Olson’s model is now employed (Schattschneider 1960; Olson 1965; 
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1982; Schlozman 1994; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; McChesney 1997) suggests that 
interest systems will be profoundly biased toward small groups with large stakes in 
government, that the policies organizations lobby for have little connection with 
member’s or sponsor’s preferences, that policies ar bought and sold like other 
commodities, and that interest systems can grow in an unconstrained manner even until 
economies collapse.  In contrast, the neopluralist construct in which the ESA model is 
embedded suggests that bias is a complex artifact o the economies of scale of interest 
representation (Lowery and Gray 2004a; Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2004), that 
preferences of members matter (Salisbury 1969),  that lobbying is often ineffective in 
securing policy returns (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993; Lowery, 2006), 
and interest systems are ultimately self-limiting i terms of size (Lowery and Gray 1995).  
Thus, while the models examined here are similar in ma y respects, they are parts of 
much larger constructs that are as profoundly antagonistic as any two theories in the 
discipline.  Finding support for either Olson’s or the ESA model of the construction of 
interest systems will certainly not topple one or another of these larger edifices.  But 
determining which specification of the construction rules governing the interest 
communities best accounts for the density of interest systems will add empirical support 
to one or the other. 
 In short, we cannot and should not be agnostic about the two models.  So, how 
should they be distinguished if our aggregate level analyses generate plausible support for 
both?  Two methods seem appropriate.  The first is to examine additional attributes of our 
aggregate models beyond the usual examination of the slope estimates of the area terms 
of the models.  Three such attributes suggest that the ESA model should be accorded 
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precedence.  First, while R-square values are too often over-interpreted, it is also true that 
they provide us at least some information about our models that might be useful.  In this 
case, as seen in figure 10, the R-square values generat d for the Olson models in table 1 
are uniformly smaller – and by large margins in several cases – than those generated for 
the ESA results in table 2.  It would seem likely that if the results of one model were an 
artifact of processes tapped by the other that the latt r would have more noise and hence a 
smaller coefficient of determination, especially so given the weak relationship between 
the actual values of the two dependent variables report d in figure 9. While hardly 
definitive, this strikes us as a small advantage for the ESA model.   
Second, and perhaps a bit more telling, the estimates for the energy terms of the 
ESA model generated rather strong results.  The energy variables were not part of 
Olson’s original theoretical model.  If lobbying communities are driven by free riding 
alone or by free riding mitigated by selective incetives, then the size of legislative 
agendas and the level of party competition should not matter.  At a minimum, the strong 
results for these variables in the ESA model and even in some of the Olson models 
represent a mark against Olson. 
And third, the very consistency of the results within the Olson models may 
constitute a strike against his specification.  TheESA model suggests that density 
dependence characterizes to one degree or another most interest guilds.  But because both 
the environmental resources that different guilds rely on and their capacities to sustain 
mobilization vary, this dependence will be expressed differently across guilds.  Different 
guilds will have different economies of scale in interest representation.  The ESA model 
does not, therefore, require that the slopes of the area terms of the several models be 
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equally steep or density dependent (Lowery and Gray 2004a; Lowery, Gray, and 
Fellowes 2004).  And the figures for the several sub-g ilds comparable to figure 5 for 
health finance registrants are indeed quite different from each other.   
In contrast, the full set of figures for the Olson model comparable to figure 4 for 
the health finance registrants are very similar.  But this consistency seems inconsistent 
with Olson’s model if all that really matters is the likelihood of having one’s free riding 
exposed.  This is especially evident in the two largest sub-guilds: direct patient care and 
health professionals.  Yet, when the simple Olsonian model (comparable to figure 4) is 
applied to these models, as seen in figures 11 and 12, they produce results that are 
downwardly sloped in the same manner as the models f the other health sub-guilds.  
This strikes us as implausible that the level of free iding would not seem appreciably 
smaller when numbers of direct care offices increases from 500 to 20,000 or numbers of 
health professionals in states increase from 50,000 to 2 0,000.18  It would seem more 
plausible to expect – from Olson’s view – that the large guilds would have extreme 
negative slopes that would then tail-off quickly with a residual of organizations lobbying 
for selective goods remaining within even relatively mid-sized populations of 
organizations with the potential to lobby.  Yet, there is marked change in the predicted 
values of participation rate even across the mid-range population values in figures 11 and 
12.  To explain this within an Olson framework, we ould need to account for why levels 
of free riding vary across very different guilds ranging in size across at least five orders 
                                                
18 Obviously, this would have been even a more severe problem had we included PLF (or 
area) in the Olson model only in a linear manner as is typical of most prior aggregate-
level tests. 
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of magnitude in such a way as to produce very similar slopes for aggregate level 
participation rates.  This would seem a difficult task.   
Instead, it is perhaps best to apply Olson’s model when numbers of potential 
lobbying organizations are relatively small, perhaps under a hundred or so.  It is in such 
settings that perceptions about the probabilities of being observed free riding are likely to 
be more meaningful.  If so, then some of the previously unexplained results in table 3 
might be understandable.  That is, we saw that substit tion of participation rate for the 
polynomial specification of the area term of the ESA model generated only weak results 
for five of the eight models.  Interestingly, however, the three models in which 
participation rate generated a correctly signed and discernible estimate were those for our 
three smallest guilds as measured by the number of organizations that might lobby – 
health finance (state average = 63.47), local governm nt (71.40) and health education 
(13.64).  Thus, it may well be true that Olson’s model provides a good account of interest 
system density when the populations supporting interes  guilds are very small.  But after 
a threshold over which perceptions of the probability of being caught free riding are no 
longer plausibly altered by further increases in the numbers of organizations that might 
lobby, any first face evidence of the aggregate levl consequences of free riding are more 
likely to be an artifact of density dependence of the type central to the ESA model of 
interest system density.    
A second manner by which to distinguish the two models goes beyond the kind of 
cross-sectional aggregate level results examined here.  First, time series of interest 
community density capture dynamic elements of vital rates of interest systems.  Our 
interpretative problem stems ultimately from reliance on cross-sectional results that do 
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not these for either model.  There are, of course, compelling practical reasons why most 
studies of interest group populations rely on comparison of populations across industries 
or across jurisdictions.  It is difficult to construct historic population data on interest 
systems.  Given these difficulties, available time series data on populations of organized 
interests focus on only one jurisdiction using total numbers of organized interests 
(Brasher, Lowery, and Gray 1999; Wolak, Lowery, andGray 2001;  Lowery and Brasher 
2004, 75) and/or a single policy domain Nownes 2004; Nownes and Lipinski 2005).  This 
severely restricts the variance on key determinants of the ESA model, especially for its 
energy variables.  Still, the evidence from the fewtime series analyses now available are 
clearly far more consistent with the expectations of the ESA model than they are with 
Olson’s.  Olson would lead us to expect that interest communities grow in a simple linear 
fashion as organizations slowly solve collective action problems using selective 
incentives.  Instead, time series analyses – with Nownes (2004) and Nownes and 
Lipinski’s (2005) analysis of gay and lesbian organiz tions perhaps serving as the gold 
standard of this type of work – shows clear evidence of slow growth with few births and 
many deaths in the legitimation phase of an interes guild, rapid growth with many births 
and few deaths following initial legitimation, and little growth with many deaths and few 
births during the mature density dependent stage of population development.  This s-
shaped pattern is a hallmark of environmentally constrained population growth (Hannan 
and Freeman 1989).  These results do not tell us everything that we wish to know about 
interest communities, such as their responsiveness to hort term changes in policy and 
politics.  Still, their consistency with ESA expectations suggests that it offers a superior 
interpretation.  
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A second and perhaps even more important literature that can aid our 
interpretation is comprised of  micro-level analyses of the collective action problem and 
the role of organizational dependence on environmental resources.  There has now been 
an accumulation of results which cut against Olson’ a alysis in a number of ways.  The 
collective action problem does not appear to be as severe at the individual-level as Olson 
proposed (Hansen 1985; Moe 1980; Marwell and Ames 1979).  Entrepreneurial leaders 
(Salisbury 1969; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) have 
a clear incentive to identify and cultivate members and sponsors (Gray and Lowery 
1996b) through a variety of means going well beyond selective incentives (Clark and 
Wilson 1961; Leighley 1996) and patron support (Berry 1999).  Thus, many 
organizations that Olson would have expected to have great difficulty forming, have 
prospered (Bosso 2005).  Yet, many organizations that do mobilize then fail, which Olson 
did not expect.  Equally important, organizational-level analyses have found that that 
variations in the vital rates of interests across populations are recognized by group leaders 
(Gray and Lowery 1997b), results that support the micro-level foundations of the ESA 
model.  Together, this suggests, as noted by Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 75), "the 
question of whether the problems discussed by Olson may have been given more 
prominence in the interest-group literature than they deserve."   
Conclusion 
 We have seen that the Olson’s (1965; 1982) collectiv  action model and Gray and 
Lowery’s (1996a) ESA model – are closely related to each other in terms of how they are 
tested at the aggregate-level with cross-sectional dat .  This means, unfortunately, that 
results supportive of one model can equally support the other.  We have explained why 
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this is so and illustrated this close relationship w th data on several sub-guilds of health 
interest organizations in the American states,. On their own terms, these results cannot 
fully resolve our problem of identifying which model more validly accounts for the 
structure of interest communities.  However, we have lso identified several secondary 
features of these cross-sectional findings that support, we believe, the ESA model rather 
than Olson’s.  And we have buttressed this evidence by r ference to time series studies 
and more micro-level analyses that provide contextual s pport for our interpretation.  In 
our view, the weight of evidence, even if indirect, clearly favors the ESA model.  Still, 
we do not want to suggest that Olson’s notion of colle tive action is irrelevant.  Rather, 
we think that it may still provide a telling account, perhaps in conjunction with elements 
of the ESA model, of how small sub-guilds of organizations form.  It is only within such 
small sub-guilds that the likelihood of exposure of free riding is plausibly meaningful 
within the range of observed numbers of members or organizations from which lobby 
organizations are drawn.  For larger sub-guilds, defined in terms of shared reliance on 
environmental resources and/or public policies with collective good features, propensities 
to free ride are already likely to be constants.  In such settings, the variables cited by the 
ESA model are far more likely to ultimately determine the density and the diversity of the 
interest community.  The raw materials produced via bottom-up processes are ultimately 
sculpted into populations by top-town pressures. 
 This assessment of our findings has two implications.  First and more narrowly, 
prior aggregate-level, cross-sectional tests of Olson’s hypothesis should be re-examined 
in terms of what they say about the ESA model.  Conversely, prior work on the ESA 
model should be re-examined in terms of Olson’s conjectures.  Second, comparison of 
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the two models raises some interesting questions about the role of contextual theories 
within our discipline.  The prominence assigned to Olson’s model results not only from 
its earlier introduction, but also from its appeal to powerful analytic traditions within the 
discipline.  Whether they are based on psychology or ec nomics, we tend to like 
explanations that are rooted in individual-level models of behavior.  Explanations tapping 
older sociological references to group properties ar  viewed suspiciously.  But this often 
appropriate bias can lead to error when we too freely xtrapolate from individual 
behavior to the population level without asking what might happen once  individuals 
interact.  This, of course, is precisely what Olson did when making the leap from The 
Logic of Collective Action to The Rise and Decline of Nations.  Some properties emerge 
only at the population-level.  Interest system density and diversity are such properties.  
Yet, we have seen that they powerfully condition how many and what kinds of organized 
interests can survive within interest systems.    
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Figure 1: Avg. No. Lobby Registrations in Total
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Figure 2: Avg. No. Establishments/Professionals in
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Figure 3: Lobbying Participation Rate in Total
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Figure 4: Lobby Part icipation Rate and Number
 of Firms in a State: Health Finance 1997
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Figure 5: Lobby Registrations and Number
 of Firms in a State: Health Finance 1997
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Figure 6: Predicted Registrat ions and Predicted Part-
icipation Rate in a State: Health Finance 1997
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Figure 7: Lobby Registrations and Lobby
Participation Rate in a State: Health Finance 1997
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Figure 8: R-Square Values Generated from Regressing Predicted 
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Figure 9: R-Square Values Generated from Regressing Actual 
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Figure 10: Comparison of R-Square Values from
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Figure 11: Lobby Participation Rate and Number
 of Firms in a State: Direct Patient Care 1997
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Figure 12: Lobby Part icipation Rate and Number
 of Professionals in a State: Health Associations 1997
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% Registered Area or Area / PLR Party Agenda
 or LR/PLR PLR Squared Dominance Size Constant R-Square
Total -1.59 ** 0.99 ** -0.31 ** 0.02 4.67 0.48
Health Care -5.31 3.34 -2.61 0.17
Direct -1.34 ** 0.78 * -0.27 * 0.07 2.17 0.36
Patient Care -4.02 2.35 -0.20 0.41
Drugs/Health -1.41 ** 0.99 ** -0.17 0.01 34.85 0.37
Products -4.46 3.26 -1.25 -0.06
Health Prof. -2.13 ** 1.56 ** -0.30 ** -0.12 0.05 0.63
Associations -7.10 5.24 -2.88 -1.03
Health -1.64 ** 1.15 ** -0.38 ** -0.03 82.70 0.40
Advocacy -4.42 3.14 -2.89 -0.22
Health -1.00 ** 0.48 0.04 0.37 ** 18.98 0.31
Finance -2.55 1.25 0.30 2.55
Local -0.71 * 0.40 -0.29 * -0.04 33.98 0.18
Gov't -2.04 1.14 -2.01 -0.25
Health -0.91 * 0.62 -0.29 * 0.11 57.01 0.14
Education -2.06 1.46 -1.92 0.73
Independent Variables
Table 1: Collective Action Models of Lobby Participation
Rates: Total Health Guild and Seven Sub-Guilds, 1997 (n=48)
** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.  Coefficients are standardized.  Values below the coeffici nts
are t-values.  Dependent variables are the percentag  of establishments (or professionals for Health 
Professional Associations) that are registered to lobby.  The measures of the independent variables are 
are discussed in the text.  
 
 




No. Registered Area or Area / PLR Party Agenda
or LR PLR Squared Dominance Size Constant R-Square
Total 1.15 ** -0.94 ** -0.36 ** 0.43 ** 213.06 0.74
Health Care 5.27 -4.45 -4.24 4.24
Direct 1.19 ** -1.04 ** -0.32 ** 0.40 ** 102.56 0.66
Patient Care 4.87 -4.29 -3.24 3.44
Drugs/Health 0.81 ** -0.69 ** -0.40 ** 0.44 ** 42.26 0.69
Products 3.64 -3.24 -4.26 3.89
Health Prof. 1.00 ** -0.73 ** -0.38 ** 0.40 ** 22.49 0.73
Associations 3.92 -2.89 -4.35 4.23
Health 0.61 * -0.19  -0.39 ** 0.25 * 23.49 0.71
Advocacy 2.38 -0.76 -4.26 2.37
Health 0.93 ** -0.63 * -0.20 0.45 ** 9.98 0.61
Finance 3.21 -2.21 -1.91 4.26
Local 0.45  -0.39 -0.35 ** 0.11 9.43 0.22
Gov't 1.34 -1.14 -2.50 0.74
Health 0.06  0.21 -0.27 * 0.24 * 3.42 0.31
Education 0.16 0.56 -1.96 1.71
** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.  Coefficients are standardized.  Values below the coeffici nts
are t-values.  Dependent variables are the number of lobby registrations by organizations in 1997.
The measures of the independent variables are discussed in the text.
Table 2: Energy, Stability, Area Models of Interest Community









Number of Participation Party Agenda
Registered Est. % (LR/PLR) Dominance Size Constant R-Square
Total -0.10  -0.51 ** 0.46 ** 343.49 0.58
Health Care 10845.38 -1.00 -5.14 4.47
Direct 0.05  0.46 ** 0.44 ** 166.60 0.47
Patient Care 10341.66 0.40 -4.10 0.39
Drugs/Health -0.03  -0.52 ** 0.47 ** 56.94 0.60
Products 288.56 -0.33 -5.35 4.75
Health Prof. -0.15  -0.53 ** 0.44 ** 33.69 0.63
Associations -- -1.57 -5.69 4.57
Health 0.08  -5.24 ** 0.50 ** 30.93 0.60
Advocacy 66.26 0.78 -5.39 4.97
Health 0.20 * -0.38 ** 0.53 ** 19.94 0.53
Finance 63.86 1.89 -3.50 4.91
Local 0.43 ** -0.30 ** 0.17 8.24 0.37
Gov't 71.40 3.55 -2.42 1.43
Health 0.37 ** -0.27 * 0.33 ** 3.21 0.38
Education 13.64 3.06 -2.18 2.74
Table 3: Substituting Lobby Participation Rates for the Supply/Area Terms
of the ESA Model: Total Health Guild and Seven Sub-Guilds, 1997 (n=48)
** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.  Coefficients are standardized.  Values below the coeffici nts
are t-values.  Dependent variables are the number of lobby registrations by organizations in 1997.
The measures of the independent variables are discussed in the text.
Independent Variables
 
 
 
